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Pierpaolo Barbieri, executive director of Niall Ferguson’s Green -
mantle advisory firm, has not written ‘a book about Spain’, as he him-
self states in the introduction. ‘Rather it is a story of political economy
and war in the tumultuous 1930s’ (p. 2). In Hitler’s Shadow Empire he
traces the creation of an informal Nazi empire back to Germany’s
intervention in the Spanish Civil War and the trade benefits Germany
was able to obtain in exchange for military support and munitions. At
the centre of this study is Hjalmar Schacht, the temporarily ubiquitous
German ‘economic dictator’, as the Financial Times called the Reichs -
bank president and minister of economic affairs in 1934.
The Spanish conflict turned out to be the only proxy war of the
1930s in which communism, fascism/National Socialism, and liber-
alism were engaged in an internationalized civil war—the third party
only in Spain, as the liberal democracies preferred non-intervention.
Barbieri eloquently describes the Spaniards’ path to civil war and
intertwines the Spanish, German, and Italian parts of the story. His
essentially chronological analysis is combined with anecdotal minia-
tures. 
Readers who do not know much about Spain in the 1920s and
1930s will profit from the first half of the book about the path to civil
war and intervention. Barbieri examines the internal conflict in Spain;
the problems the Spanish question posed for the already precarious
international system; and, finally, Schacht’s economic concepts and
German economic policy up to the mid 1930s. It is only in the middle
of the book that Barbieri announces his leitmotiv (pp. 133–4) and
brings together ‘the two hitherto distinct narratives of this study:
Spain’s path to civil war and Nazi Germany’s road to recovery under
the stewardship of Germany’s “economic dictator”’ (p. 138).
The sections about the political economy of Schacht’s informal
empire are the most interesting but also most debatable parts of the
monograph. The Reichsbank president’s biographer, Christopher
Kopper, had already invoked the idea of ‘informal empire’ in the con-
text of Schacht’s plea for colonial expansion,1 a rather fruitless thread
1 Christopher Kopper, Hjalmar Schacht: Aufstieg und Fall von Hitlers mächtigs-
tem Bankier (Munich, 2006), 295–305.
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of the Nazi foreign policy discussion. Barbieri’s merit is to extend this
idea to trade relations with Spain.
Based on a thorough interpretation of Schacht’s doctoral thesis,
neglected by earlier scholars, Barbieri’s study shows how Schacht’s
early academic work and experiences during the First World War
shaped his political thinking. Schacht’s ‘imperial, mercantilistic strat-
egy’ (p. 168) involved disengaging from Anglo-American trade part-
ners and reorienting Germany’s attention towards the Balkans, Latin
America, and, finally, Spain. With these partners, the political and
eco nomic asymmetry was reversed in favour of Germany, so that bet-
ter terms of trade were possible. Drawing on various sources, espe-
cially private conversations and public interventions during the 1920s
and 1930s, Barbieri reconstructs Schacht’s economic and political
position, summarized as Weltpolitik: centralized economic decision-
making and state intervention at home up to the point of micro-man-
agement; colonial expansion; and a preference for trade with coun-
tries on which Germany could impose one-sided terms of trade.
Barbieri seems undecided, however, whether to describe these ideas
as ‘re-emerging mercantilism’ (p. 117), ‘neomercantilist’ (p. 133), or
‘pseudo-mercantilist’ (p. 91).
The Spanish endeavour and its subsequent quid pro quo (Spanish
raw materials for munitions and overt military intervention) fitted
well into these concepts. German–Spanish trade soon reached new
dimensions, as did Spanish debt to Germany. Political, military, and
trade relations between Germany and Spain were clearly not a ‘rela-
tionship of equals’ (p. 149). As Barbieri shows, ideology was at most
a secondary factor. This applied to Hitler’s decision to support the
Spanish army’s rebellion, and, in particular, to back the Franco fac-
tion, which was not self-evident. Barbieri gives a precise and dense
account of the decision-making process on 25 July 1936 in Bayreuth.
The economic dimensions of this decision were clear. To organize the
clearing of German–Spanish trade, two monopoly companies were
founded at short notice, HISMA in Spain (replaced in 1939 by
SOFINDUS) and ROWAK in Germany. They worked under the
super vision of the Foreign Organization branch of the Nazi Party
(NSDAP/AO), thus indirectly in the realm of Schacht’s most impor-
tant opponent, Hermann Göring. 
Barbieri integrates these events into a larger evaluation of Nazi
foreign policy in the mid 1930s, drawing a conclusion by analogy that
does not convince this reviewer. Hitler’s interest in the economic
exploitation of Spain does not mean that Schachtian Weltpolitik was
ever a viable alternative to the Lebensraum objective. By contrasting
the Reichsbank president’s pragmatism on the one hand with seem-
ingly surreal Lebensraum goals on the other, Barbieri implies a false
opposition. Hitler had a functionalist view of economy and trade,
which were not an end in themselves. All sources, from Mein Kampf
to the speeches of 1 February 1933 and 5 November 1937, show that
Hitler believed neither in economic imperialism and colonies nor in
trade or an export economy. Although Barbieri postulates a reading
of the 1937 Hossbach Memorandum ‘through a different lens’ (pp.
185–6), he is not, ultimately, able to give an alternative interpreta-
tion.
Barbieri accurately describes the ‘policy struggle’ (p. 131) in 1936
which pitted Schacht against Göring. Schacht’s search for an ‘exit
strategy’ (p. 157) from the misguided growth and armament over-
production of the first years of Nazi rule did not accord with the
plans of Hitler and those around him. They did not share Schacht’s
diagnosis (too much armament) and would not have prescribed the
same remedy (an economic slowdown). In this situation, Schacht was
‘sidelined in Berlin as Hitler drifted [sic!] towards a wider war’ (p. 9),
an expression that, once again, gives a rather curious interpretation of
Hitler’s agenda. On the whole, Barbieri overstates Schacht’s influence
outside the economic sphere and especially on questions of principle,
such as the long-term goals of foreign policy and war.
The chronological relationship of this policy struggle to the
Spanish endeavour remains vague. Curiously enough, the Vier jahres -
plan memorandum was drafted under Göring’s auspices at around
the same time as Hitler decided in favour of intervention. This said,
interpreting the following exploitation of Spain as an example of
Schachtian informal empire is questionable. Barbieri himself states
that even after Schacht was ousted, German–Spanish trade continued
as before. He points out that Spain remained crucial for German
imports even after 1939, as the ‘formal’ empire took shape. Against
this background, strong ex post facto assumptions postulating a con-
ditional nexus and a sequence instead of simultaneity are not con-
vincing: ‘Crafting the exploitative, genocidal, and ultimately ephem -
eral empire for which we remember the Nazis required [sic!] burying
[sic!] the informal one on Iberian soil’ (p. 245). 
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Contrary to what is suggested in the introduction, Barbieri does
not present a ‘useful counterfactual’ by describing an ‘Empire that
could have been’ (p. 3). He gives an explicit narration of an allegedly
functional Schachtian ‘informal empire’ that was torpedoed by igno-
rant Nazis and their power games. In order to prove its supposed
‘effectiveness’ (p. 12), in his final chapters Barbieri contrasts the
German experience with the return on investment of the Italian inter-
vention in Spain and with later forms of German occupation in
Europe. The outcome for Mussolini was modest, although the Italian
investment of money, men, and matériel doubled the German effort.
Barbieri argues convincingly that the Duce’s focus on ideological
friendship, propaganda, and Italian splendour prevented his officials
from collecting trade-offs similar to those obtained by their German
partner and competitor. The second comparison is less convincing. In
the ninth chapter (‘Formal Empire’), Barbieri contents himself with a
survey of the standard literature on different annexed and occupied
countries. The supposed superiority of informal rule, deemed more
‘sustainable’ (p. 13) than the overt exploitation of eastern Europe
depends mainly on the fact that the German occupation regime after
1939 was short-lived. 
The alleged effectiveness and sustainability of ‘informal empire’
can also be questioned by looking at the Spanish case itself. Barbieri
himself concedes that Germany could not maintain political, military,
and economic pressure in the long term. For some years German
trade eclipsed the traditionally dominant Anglo-French trade with
Spain, and HISMA/SOFINDUS even tried to perpetuate the situa-
tion by converting the growing Spanish debt into direct investments,
especially in mines in Spain and Morocco. But the ‘informal empire’,
in fact, was limited in time, scale, and scope, as Franco increasingly
played for time instead of satisfying German demands. From the
beginning of the Second World War he had more room for manoeu-
vre and gained autonomy from his former allies, whereas Germany’s
dependence on Spanish resources grew. Germany’s economic ‘pene-
tration of Spain’ (p. 147) relied on a contingent historical situation
and thus remained incomplete.
This reviewer would have liked to know more about the
HISMA/ROWAK complex. How did the clearing of German–Spanish
trade work exactly? Who was involved? How was business done on
the ground? How did the flow of information between German indus-
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try, German economic bureaucracy, HISMA/ROWAK, and, finally,
their Spanish counterparts work? As Barbieri privileges a top-down
approach, the answers unfortunately remain abstract, although
HISMA/ROWAK is the cornerstone of both Spain’s integration into
the German economic system and Barbieri’s argument.
The bibliography is extensive, as the author is well-versed in the
English-, Italian-, and Spanish-language research.2 But a run-through
of the footnotes shows that the German literature is sometimes quite
outdated and cited in a rather unspecific way (e.g. ch. 6, nn. 44, 49, 52,
61, 68, 77, 81). Barbieri has used material from all the relevant
archives in France, Germany, Italy, the UK, and the USA, but he priv-
ileges published sources in his annotations, especially in the case of
German sources. These observations may explain his debatable eval-
uation of the German policy discussion and his all too easy refutation
of old-style research which saw German foreign policy ‘on an “inex-
orable” road to war’ (p. 3) and interpreted the quest for Lebensraum
as a ‘preordained path of Nazi rule’ (p. 131). Some metaphors fit in
with Barbieri’s ‘empire’ terminology but seem misleading to this re -
viewer, for example, calling the German intervention a ‘fully fledged
colonial endeavor’ (p. 134) or naming HISMA’s managing director
Johannes Bernhardt an ‘effective viceroy’ (p. 188).
The appendix of ‘economic data’ contains seven charts which are
either of minor relevance to Barbieri’s argument (for example, Ger -
man hyperinflation 1922–6, German unemployment rates 1921–39,
and so forth) or give only overall trends in Spanish imports and ex -
ports. Figure A.7 is particularly intriguing, as Barbieri illustrates the
ratio of ‘Cumulative German and Italian Intervention Costs’ (33 and
67 per cent respectively) by presenting the two figures in a pie chart:
1,932 as against 3,914 million pesetas. 
Barbieri is not the first scholar to integrate discussions on German
and Italian intervention with the question of Nazi economic and
trade policy, but he does so in a sophisticated and readable way that
will probably reach a wider audience than earlier literature. The
book, already translated into Italian (2015, Mon dadori), presents a
good overview of German and Italian intervention in the Spanish
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2 Unfortunately the bibliography was only available online on the website
advertising the book and has since disappeared: <http://www.hitlersshad-
owempire.com/bibliography/>, accessed 1 Aug. 2016.
Civil War embedded in the international context. Emphasizing
Schacht’s role is important but, in the end, the argument by analogy
(Schacht’s programmatic texts correspond to forms of organizing
German–Spanish trade) does not hold. Instead of opposing two
mutually exclusive models of imperialism, the author might have
found it more interesting to think of them as complementary forms
of exploitation and exercising power. Finally, comparing the Nazi
idea of European hegemony and empire with the status and the
underlying idea of the European Union, its common market and
common currency (pp. 246–7) is, at best, a distortion.
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